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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Adam Archie R. Costin appeals from the district court's orders revoking
his probation and denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction of the unified
sentence of five years, with two years fixed, imposed upon his guilty plea to
felony injury to a child.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Eighteen-year-old Costin had sexual intercourse with 15-year-old C.B. on
several occasions over a one and one-half to two-year period. (PSI, pp.1, 1114.1)

The state charged him with rape.

(R., pp.29-30.)

Pursuant to a plea

agreement, Costin pied guilty to an amended charge of felony injury to a child
and the state agreed to not oppose a withheld judgment. (R., pp.39-43; 10/30/08
Tr., p.4, L.2 - p.12, L.11.)

The district court withheld judgment and placed

Costin on probation for three years. (R., pp.51-62.)
Approximately seven months later, the state filed a report of probation
violation, alleging that Costin had violated his probation by failing to provide
truthful information on a full disclosure polygraph, failing to submit to an
additional polygraph as instructed by his probation officer, changing residences
without permission, failing to appear for random drug testing in May and June
2009, failing to report to his probation officer in May and June 2009, and failing
to pay restitution. (R., pp.74-77.) After an evidentiary hearing, the district court
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Pages attached to the PSI have been numbered consecutively, beginning at
page 10.
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found Costin in violation of his probation as alleged in the report of violation. (R.,
pp.81-85.)

The court revoked Costin's withheld judgment and probation,

imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, and retained
jurisdiction.

(R., pp.86, 88-90.)

At the conclusion of the retained jurisdiction

period, the district court suspended the balance of Costin's sentence and again
placed him on probation for three years. (R., pp.91-100.)
Approximately two months later, Costin's probation officer filed a progress
report indicating that the officer had discovered on Costin's cell phone "several
sexually related text messages and pictures and video of at least two separate
females performing sexual acts." (R., p.101.) The officer also noted that, "during
his full disclosure polygraph, Mr. Costin admitted to having had unauthorized
sexual intercourse with an adult female (verified) on multiple occasions since
being placed on probation." (R., p.101.) Costin was sanctioned with 30 days
discretionary jail time. (R., p.102.)
Costin was released from jail on June 13, 2010.
September 27, 2010, he tested positive for marijuana.

(R., p.102.)

(R., p.103.)

On

He was

sanctioned with two days discretionary jail time. (R., p.106.) A little more than
two months later, Costin again tested positive for marijuana and also submrtted a
diluted

urine sample;

he was sanctioned with an additional two days

discretionary jail time, beginning on January 10, 2011. (R., p.107.)
On March 1, 2011, Costin's probation officer filed an affidavit alleging that
Costin had "violated his probation by having contact with the victim, unauthorized
sexual contact, accessing the Internet, using social networks, Skype.
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He has

consumed alcohol and smoked marijuana while on probation, failed to do
treatment as required."

(R., p.108 (verbatim).)

On March 3, 2011, Costin's

probation officer filed a formal report of probation violation, alleging 13 different
ways in which Costin had violated his probation, including: viewing pornography;
accessing the Internet; traveling outside his assigned district without permission;
engaging in unauthorized sexual relationships with five different females,
including the victim in this case; violating his curfew on numerous occasions;
having unauthorized contact with the victim via telephone, text messaging
(including "sexting"), and social media; failing to maintain employment; failing to
abide by the terms of his probation restricting his telephone usage; diluting his
urine to alter the results of UA testing and submitting nine invalid urine samples;
consuming alcohol; failing to pay the cost of supervision; and failing to enter
specialized sex offender treatment as directed by his probation officer.

(R.,

pp.114-19.) Costin admitted 12 of the allegations and the district court found the
remaining allegation proved after an evidentiary hearing. (R., pp.135-38; 5/17/11
Tr., p.40, L.4 - p.50, L.11.) The court thereafter revoked Costin's probation and
ordered his underlying sentence executed. (R., pp.141-42.) Costin filed a timely
Rule 35 motion for reduction of his sentence (R., pp.147-48), which the district
court denied (Order Denying I.C.R. 35 Motion (augmentation)).
appealed. (R., pp.143-46.)
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Costin timely

ISSUES
Costin states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Costin due process
and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment
with the requested transcript?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked
probation and executed the underlying sentence?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
Costin's Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for a reduction of
sentence in light of his progress during incarceration?

(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Costin failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his
due process and equal protection rights by denying his motion to augment
the appellate record with an irrelevant transcript?

2.

Has Costin failed to establish an abuse of the district court's sentencing
discretion?

3.

Has Costin failed to establish an abuse of discretion in the denial of his
Rule 35 motion?

4

ARGUMENT

I.
Costin Has Failed To Establish That The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His
Constitutional Rights By Denying His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record
With An Irrelevant Transcript
A.

Introduction
After the appellate record was settled, Costin filed a motion to augment

with, inter a/ia, an as-yet unprepared transcript of "the Probation Violation
Admit/Deny Hearing held on August 17, 2009."

2

(Motion To Augment And To

Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof, filed
November 29, 2011.) The Idaho Supreme Court denied Costin's motion insofar
as it sought the preparation and inclusion in the appellate record of the August
17, 2009 transcript. (Order, filed January 11, 2012.)
Costin now contends that, by denying his motion to augment the appellate
3

record with the requested transcript, the Idaho Supreme Court has violated his
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and has effectively
denied him effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-

2

Although Costin denominated the August 17, 2009 hearing an "admit/deny"
hearing, the court minutes of August 17, 2009, reflect that Costin denied the
probation violation allegations and an evidentiary hearing was conducted. (R.,
pp.81-86.)
3

Costin states in his Appellant's brief that he is "challenging the Idaho Supreme
Court's denial of his request for the transcript of the August 17, 2011, probation
violation admission hearing." (Appellant's brief, p.5 (emphasis added).) The
state assumes this is a typographical error.
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15.)

Costin has failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights,

however, because he has failed to show that the requested transcript is even
relevant to, much less necessary for resolution of, the only issues over which this
Court has jurisdiction on appeal.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one

of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App.
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001 ).

C.

Costin Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement To The
Requested Augmentation
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to "a record on appeal that is

sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the
proceedings below." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477
(2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372
U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms and
Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)). The state,
however, "will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide
transcripts or other items that "will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. at 495; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 112
n.5 (1996) ("an indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the trial
record that are germane to consideration of the appeal" (internal citations
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omitted)); Lane, 372 U.S. 477; Griffin, 351 U.S. 12. To demonstrate that the
record is not sufficient, the defendant must show that any omissions from the
record prejudiced his ability to pursue the appeal. State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615,
620-21, 448 P.2d 229, 234-35 (1968) (distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho
148, 438 P.2d 893 (1968)). See also United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 93
(1st Cir. 2002). To show prejudice Costin "must present something more than
gross speculation that the transcripts were requisite to a fair appeal." Scott v.
Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2002). Costin has failed to carry this burden.
Costin's appeal is timely only from the district court's May 17, 2011 order
revoking his probation and its August 8, 2011 order denying his Rule 35 motion
for reduction of sentence.

(See R., pp.141-48.) He argues that the Idaho

Supreme Court denied him due process and equal protection by denying his
motion to augment the appellate record with an as-yet unprepared transcript of
an August 17, 2009 probation violation hearing, but he has failed to adequately
explain, much less demonstrate, how a transcript of a hearing held almost two
years before the decisions at issue in this case, and in relation to a completely
unrelated set of probation violation allegations, is necessary to decide the only
issues over which this Court has jurisdiction on this appeal.
Costin contends that, in deciding to revoke his probation at the May 17,
2011 disposition hearing, the district court "made an express reference [to his]
prior probation violations, the disposition of which occurred at the August 17,
2009" hearing.

(Appellant's brief, p.11.)

Contrary to Costin's assertions,

however, there is no evidence that the district court, in referring to Costin's 2009
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probation violations at the May 17, 2011 hearing, considered anything more than
what is set forth in the July 23, 2009 probation violation report and the August
17, 2009 court minutes, items that are already included in the appellate record.
(See R., pp.74-77, 81-86; compare 5/17/11 Tr., p.65, Ls.23-25 ("Your first report
of probation violation back in July of 2009 was serious.

Not doing the drug

testing, you're not doing the polygraph testing.").) Indeed, the record is devoid of
evidence that the district court had a transcript of the August 17, 2009 probation
violation hearing when it revoked Costin's probation in May 2011, or that it relied
upon anything said at the August 17, 2009 hearing as a basis for its decisions,
almost two years later, to revoke Costin's probation and deny his Rule 35
motion. Because the as-yet unprepared transcript was never presented to the
district court in relation to the probation revocation and Rule 35 proceedings at
issue in this case, it was never part of the record before the district court and is
not properly considered for the first time on appeal. See State v. Mitchell, 124
Idaho 374, 376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993) (in rendering a
decision on the issues raised on appeal, the appellate court is "limited to review
of the record made below" and "will not consider new evidence that was never
before the trial court"); see also Huerta v. Huerta, 127 Idaho 77, 80, 896 P.2d
985, 988 (Ct. App. 1995) ("It is not the role of this Court to entertain new
allegations of fact and consider new evidence.").
The state recognizes the Court of Appeals' statement in State v.
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009), relied on by Costin
(Appellant's brief, p.12), that appellate "review [of] a sentence that is ordered into
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execution following a period of probation" is based "upon the facts existing when
the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original
sentencing and the revocation of probation."

Contrary to Costin's assertions,

however, Hanington does not stand for the proposition that a merits-based
review of a decision to revoke probation and order a sentence executed requires
preparation and inclusion in the appellate record of transcripts of every hearing
over which the trial court presided. To the contrary, the law is well established
that, absent a showing that evidence was presented at prior hearings and that
the district court relied on such evidence in reaching its decision to revoke
probation, an appellant is not entitled to transcription at public expense of every
hearing conducted before the date probation was finally revoked. Mayer v. City
of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 (1971) (state is not "required to expend its funds
unnecessarily" where "part or all of the stenographic transcript ... will not be
germane to consideration of the appeal" (citation and internal quotations
omitted)); Draper, 372 U.S. at 496 ("[T]he fact that an appellant with funds may
choose to waste his money by unnecessarily including in the record all of the
transcripts does not mean that the State must waste its funds by providing what
is unnecessary for adequate appellate review.").
Although there may be some circumstances that require inclusion in the
appellate record of transcripts of prior hearings to fully review the revocation of
probation, Costin has failed to show that any such circumstances apply here.
Costin has failed to point to anything in the record that would indicate that what
happened at the August 17, 2009 hearing (as opposed to the fact of the 2009
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probation violations themselves, which are detailed in the July 2009 report of
violation) was considered or played any role in the court's decisions in May and
August of 2011, respectively, to revoke Costin's probation and deny his Rule 35
motion for reduction of his sentence. As such, Costin has failed to show that
such transcript is necessary to complete an adequate record on this appeal.
Citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971 ), Costin claims that
he is only required to make a "colorable argument" that he needs an "item" or
"items" to complete a record before the burden transfers to the state "to prove
that the requested items are not necessary for the appeal." (Appellant's brief,
p.10.)

He also argues, with no citation whatsoever, that "to meet the

constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection," the state must
provide him (and all indigent defendants) with whatever appellate record he
desires unless the state proves that "some or all of the requested materials are
unnecessary or frivolous." (Appellant's brief, p.7; see also p.5 ('The only way a
court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested
transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal.").)
No reading of Mayer supports these legal arguments.
Mayer was convicted on non-felony charges punishable only by a fine and
he appealed, challenging the sufficiency of evidence and asserting a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct. !s;L. at 190. The appellate court denied his request for
a trial transcript at government expense on the basis of a local rule providing that
verbatim transcripts of trial proceedings would be provided at government
expense only for felonies. !s;L. at 191-93. The issue was not whether Mayer was

10

entitled to a record of his trial, but whether he was entitled to a verbatim
transcript of his trial.

l!t

at 193. The Court noted it had addressed a similar

issue in Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), where the Court held that
the government need not provide transcripts that were not '"germane to
consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds
unnecessarily in such circumstances."' Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194 (quoting Draper,
372 U.S. at 495-96).

However, "the State must provide a full verbatim record

where that is necessary to assure the indigent as effective an appeal as would
be available to the defendant with resources to pay his own way."

l!t

at 195.

"Moreover, where the grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable
need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a
portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on
those grounds."

l!t

Thus, if it is not clear on the existing record, an indigent appellant must
establish that a record of certain "proceedings" is germane to the appeal.

l!t at

194. Only after the germaneness of the requested record of the proceedings is
established and a colorable need for a verbatim record is shown by the appellant
will the burden shift to the state to demonstrate that a partial transcript or some
record other than a verbatim transcript will be adequate.

l!t at

194-95. See also

Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227-28 (1971) (in deciding whether
requested record necessary court should consider the "value of the transcript to
the defendant in connection with the appeal," but standard does not require "a

11

showing of need tailored to the facts of the particular case" and the court may
take notice of the importance of a transcript).
Here the proceedings challenged on appeal are the revocation of Costin's
probation and the denial of his Rule 35 motion in May and August of 2011,
respectively.

The record related to the district court's decisions is already

complete because all of the evidence considered by the district court is before
the appellate court. (See,~. 12/8/08 PSI; 2/4/10 APSI; R., pp.74-77 (7/23/09
Report of Probation Violation), pp.81-86 (minutes of 8/17/09 probation violation
evidentiary and disposition hearing), p.101 (5/2/10 Progress Report), p.103
(10/7/10 Progress Report), p.107 (1/10/11 Order of Commitment), pp.114-31
(3/3/11 Report of Probation Violation and attachments).) It is Costin's appellate
burden to establish that the requested transcript is necessary to create an
adequate appellate record to review the orders revoking his probation and
denying his Rule 35 motion. The augmentation he sought, however, was of a
never before prepared transcript of a hearing held nearly two years before the
district court rendered the decisions at issue in this case. Nothing in the record
even suggests that the requested transcript (or anything contained therein) was
before the district court in relation to the 2011 probation revocation and Rule 35
proceedings.

Because Costin failed to make a showing of germaneness and

colorable need for the requested transcripts, there is no burden on the state.
Because all of the evidence before the district court is in the appellate record,

12

that record is adequate for appellate review, and Costin has failed to establish a
violation of his due process rights. 4 Strand, 137 Idaho at 463, 50 P.3d at 478.
Costin has also failed to establish that denial of his request to augment
the record on appeal with an irrelevant transcript denied him equal protection.
Costin cites to several cases where criminal defendants were denied appellate
records because of their indigence. (See Appellant's brief, pp.7-12 (citing, ~ .
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487
(1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963)).) However, there is nothing in the
record that in any way indicates that the Idaho Supreme Court denied Costin's
request for the transcript solely because he is indigent. In fact, Costin's motion
would have properly been denied even if he had the funds to pay for the
transcript. The Idaho Appellate Rules require any party seeking augmentation to
set forth a ground sufficient to justify the augmentation requested.

I.AR. 30.

Costin's motion to augment failed because he failed to meet this minimal burden,
imposed upon all parties, of showing that the transcript was necessary or even

4

As a component of his due process claim, Costin argues that the denial of his
motion to augment the record with the requested transcripts has deprived him of
effective assistance of counsel on appeal.
(Appellant's brief, pp.13-15.)
Because, for the reasons already explained, Costin has failed to show that the
requested transcripts are necessary, or even relevant, for appellate review of the
district court's order revoking his probation, there is no possibility that the denial
of the motion to augment has deprived Costin of effective assistance of counsel
on this appeal.
13

helpful in addressing appellate issues.

The Idaho Supreme Court's order

properly denied the motion to augment because Costin failed to make a showing
that any appellant - indigent or otherwise - would be entitled to augment the
record as requested.

There is no reason to believe that the motion to augment

would have been granted had Costin been paying for the requested transcript;
the rule applies to all parties, not just the indigent.
Costin has failed to show that the denial of his motion to augment was in
any way in-nuenced or decided by his indigence, nor has he demonstrated that
the requested transcript is necessary to complete a record adequate to review
any issue over which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal. To the contrary, the
record amply demonstrates that Costin's motion to augment with the requested
transcript was properly denied because he failed to show that the transcript was
necessary for adequate review of the district court's decisions to revoke Costin's
probation and deny his Rule 35 motion. Because Costin has failed to show his
due process and equal protection rights were implicated, much less violated, by
the denial of his motion to augment, he has failed to show any basis for relief.

11.
Costin Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
A.

Introduction
After finding that Costin violated his probation in 13 different ways,

including by having continued sexual contact with the victim and by failing to
obtain sex offender treatment, the district court revoked Costin's probation and
ordered his sentence executed. (R., pp.141-42.) On appeal, "Costin concedes

14

that he violated the terms [of] his probation."

(Appellant's brief, p.16.)

He

argues, however, that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his
probation in light of his young age, the fact that he had a probation plan and
because, according to Costin, his "behavior [in the underlying offense] was not
that egregious."

(Appellant's brief, pp.17-20.)

None of Costin's arguments

establish an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (citing State v.
Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994)).

C.

Costin Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Revoking His Probation
A district court's decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on

appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion. State v. Lafferty,
125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994).

An abuse of

discretion cannot be found if the district court's decision was consistent with
applicable legal standards, and was reached by an exercise of reason.

kl

"The purpose of probation is rehabilitation." State v. Wilson, 127 Idaho
506, 510, 903 P.2d 95, 99 (Ct. App. 1995). "In deciding whether revocation of
probation is the appropriate response to a violation, the court considers whether
the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continued
probation is consistent with protection of society."

State v. Leach, 135 Idaho

525, 529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001 ). Any cause satisfactory to the court,

15

which indicates that probation is not meeting its goals, is sufficient to justify
revocation.

Wilson, 127 Idaho at 510, 903 P.2d at 99.

Contrary to Costin's

assertions on appeal, a review of the record supports the district court's
determination that Costin's probation was no longer achieving the goal of
rehabilitation nor was it consistent with the protection of society.
Costin had sexual intercourse with a 15-year-old girl. (PSI, pp.1, 11-14.)
Costin claims on appeal that his "behavior was not that egregious" and that this
was merely "a case of an eighteen year old high school student who had sex with
another student" who reportedly initiated the sexual contact. (Appellant's brief,
pp.16-17.) Costin fails to mention, however, that the sexual contact that led to
his conviction in this case was not a one-time occurrence. In fact, after initially
denying any relationship with the victim (PSI, pp.19-20), Costin admitted to
police that he had known the victim since she was 12 years old and that he and
the victim had been having "sex once or twice a month" for the previous one and
one-half to two years - i.e., since the victim was 13 or 14 years old (PSI, p.13).
Despite these admissions, the district court treated Costin as though he were a
first-time offender and gave him the benefit of a withheld judgment and
probation, stating:
Enough people in court today have told you how stupid you are, so
I'm not gonna add to that list, but I want to give you the opportunity
over the next five years to show that you don't have a problem in
this or any other regard and that you are entitled to a withheld
judgment and just put this behind you, but you're going to have to
use your head at all times in the next five years ....
(12/17/08 Tr., p.27, Ls.2-9.)

16

Costin did not "use [his] head" on probation. Within the first seven months
of his probationary period, Costin failed during a polygraph examination "to
provide truthful information as to the number of victims under the age of
Eighteen (18)" and thereafter failed to submit to an additional polygraph
examination, thus depriving the district court and the probation officer of any
ability to assess Costin's risk of sexually reoffending. (R., pp.74-76.) He also
moved without permission and without providing his probation officer a physical
address, failed to pay restitution, twice failed to appear for random drug testing
and failed two months in a row to report for scheduled appointments with his
probation officer.

(R., pp.74-76.) Costin claims on appeal that the reason he

changed his residence without permission "was to go to college." (Appellant's
brief, p.18 (citing R., p.75).) Costin offered this same excuse to his probation
officer, but it turned out to be false as a check with the Wyoming trade school
that Costin claimed to be attending confirmed that Costin was not enrolled. (R.,
p.75.) Ultimately, Costin's failures to report to his probation officer and to provide
the officer with any physical address thwarted what is obviously the primary goal
of any probation - i.e., to give the offender "an opportunity to be rehabilitated

under proper control and supervision." State v. Sandoval, 92 Idaho 853, 860,
452 P.2d 350, 357 (1969) (citing State v. Oyler, 92 Idaho 43, 436 P.2d 706
(1968)) (emphasis added).
After squandering his first opportunity for probation, Costin completed a
period of retained jurisdiction, during which he participated in substance abuse
education and sex offender treatment programming.
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(See generally APSI.)

Costin soon proved that the programming he received was wasted on him
because, beginning just two months after being placed on probation following his
period of retained jurisdiction, Costin engaged in a continuous series of
inappropriate sexual relationships and illegal drug use. (R., pp.101-03, 106-08,
114-19.)

He tested positive for marijuana on at least two occasions and

submitted multiple invalid urine samples. (R., pp.103, 107-08, 116-18.) He also
maintained sexually explicit images on his cell phone, viewed pornography via
the Internet, and engaged in sexual relations~1ips with five different females including the victim in this case - without his probation officer's permission and
without obtaining the sex offender treatment that was required as a condition of
his probation. (R., pp.101, 108, 114-18.)
In the end, Costin admitted to 12 formal probation violation allegations
and disputed only one - that he had "not entered into a specialized sex offender
treatment programs since being placed on probation." (R., pp.114-18; 5/17/11
Tr., p.40, Ls.4-21.)

As to the disputed allegation, Costin asserted through

counsel that he was unable to pay for the psychosexual evaluation that was a
prerequisitetoanysexoffendertreatment. (5/17/11 Tr., p.42, L.19-p.46, L.18.)
In response to this assertion, the state produced a letter written by the
psychosexual evaluator to Costin in April 2011, in which the evaluator responded
to Costin's assertions that the evaluator was "withholding treatment" from him.
(5/17/11 Tr., p.46, L.24 - p.49, L.3; Exhibit 1.) The evaluator wrote:
The reality of the situation from my perspective as to why I'm
refusing to complete the evaluation on you is that you had your
victim [C.B.] come into the office and pay out of her pocket for your
evaluation.
You were first referred to this office to do a
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psychosexual evaluation on March 23, 2010. By the time you were
arrested nearly a year later you had still not completed the
evaluation as you had been ordered by your probation office[r] to
do. In addition during this time you violated your probation in
multiple ways by accessing pornography on the Internet, having
sexual relationships with at least 5 women including your charged
victim without your probation officers [sic] approval, using alcohol
and drugs, and violating various rules of probation such as curfew,
travel restrictions, etc. The reality is that you have not taken your
probation seriously and now you are in jail and saying you haven't
had a chance to "prove yourself' in treatment, I'm being "unfair" etc.
You were given plenty of opportunities to act responsibly
and to follow the rules of your probation and finish your evaluation
in a timely matter [sic] and instead you chose to repeatedly violate
the rules of your probation. If you are released from jail/prison then
I am willing to meet with you and your probation officer to see if
outpatient counseling has any chance of being successful with you.
It certainly will not be successful if you maintain your present
attitude of blaming others for your problems. Meanwhile I refuse to
complete the evaluation that you put off doing and now have had
audacity to have your victim pay for.
(Exhibit 1 (emphasis in original).)

Ultimately, the district court found that the

allegation concerning Costin's failure to obtain sex offender treatment had "been
proven well beyond a more probable than not basis." (5/17/11 Tr., p.50, Ls.711.)
On appeal, Costin does not challenge the district court's finding that he
violated the terms of his probation in the 13 ways alleged in the report of
violation.

(Appellant's brief, p.16.)

Nor does he challenge the district court's

conclusion that Costin's failure on probation was attributable solely to the series
of poor decisions Costin made. (See 5/17/11 Tr., p.65, L.17 - p.67, L.21.) In
fact, Costin acknowledges that he "made some bad decisions" but claims that
"there was no reason to send [him] to prison, in light of his proffered probation
plan." (Appellant's brief, p.20.) As articulated by his attorney at the disposition
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hearing, Costin's proffered "probation plan" consisted of his purported willingness
to secure employment and to obtain sex offender and substance abuse
treatment. (5/17/11 Tr., p.63, L.13 - p.64, L.16.) All of these were conditions of
Costin's probation in the first place. (See R., pp.97-100.) In light of this fact, it is
unsurprising that the district court was unwilling to give Costin a third opportunity
to prove that he was willing, or even capable, of complying with the terms of
probation when, in the district court's words, Costin had already "completely
disregarded everything [the court] tried to put in place to help" him. (5/17/11 Tr.,
p.65, Ls.17-22.) Nor has Costin established that the district court's unwillingness
to continue Costin on probation constituted an abuse of discretion. As noted by
the district court, Costin's "actions are what speak" and nothing that Costin did in
the three years since committing the underlying offense indicated that Costin
was "at all serious about dealing with [his] situation." (5/17/11 Tr., p.67, Ls.1115.)
The district court considered all of the relevant information and reasonably
determined that Costin was no longer an appropriate candidate for community
supervision. Costin has failed to establish an abuse of discretion in the district
court's decision to revoke his probation.

111.
Costin Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Denying His Rule 35 Motion
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203,
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159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). Costin did not appeal from the judgment imposing his
underlying sentence of five years, with two years fixed. Therefore, to prevail on
his claim that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35
motion, Costin must "show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the
Rule 35 motion." ~; see also State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440,
442 (2008) (absent the presentation of new evidence, an appeal from the denial
of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying
sentence). Costin has failed to satisfy his burden.
The only "new" information Costin provided in support of his Rule 35
motion was his testimony that he was participating in a number of optional
programs while incarcerated, had "come up with a parole plan" that included
obtaining a full-time job and participating in community-based sex offender and
substance abuse treatment, and had been keeping an introspective journal. 5
(8/3/11 Tr., p.5, L.15 - p.15, L.3.) The district court considered this information
but rejected as a basis for reducing Costin's sentence for two reasons. (8/3/11
Tr., p.18, L.17 - p.19, L.17.) First, it reasoned that reducing the determinate
portion of Costin's sentence would likely deprive Costin of any opportunity to get
sex offender treatment while incarcerated, which the district court had specifically
recommended as a prerequisite to any parole. (8/3/11 Tr., p.18, L.24 - p.19,

5

Costin also submitted a letter of support written by his high school counselor,
but the district court found that the letter was not new information, stating, "It's
similar to a letter that I received almost three years ago at an earlier point in time
from the same person." (8/3/11 Tr., p.4, Ls.15-22.)
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L.10.) Second, and more importantly, the district court determined that Costin's
desire for community-based rehabilitation did not outweigh the gravity of his
offense, his multiple probation violations, and his failure to obtain communitybased sex offender treatment when given the opportunity to do so. (8/3/11 Tr.,
p.19, Ls.11-15.)
Costin challenges the denial of his Rule 35 motion, contending that the
new information, combined with other "mitigating factors" that were already
considered by the court when it imposed the underlying sentence, "support the
conclusion that [his] sentence is recessively [sic] harsh."
p.22.)

(Appellant's brief,

To the extent Costin is claiming that the "mitigating factors" he cites

render his sentence unreasonable as imposed, such claim is beyond the scope
of this Court's review because Costin did not appeal from his underlying
sentence. To the extent Costin's claim is that his sentence should be reduced
because "neither [he] nor society are benfiting [sic] from" his prison sentence,
such claim is directly contrary to his own testimony at the Rule 35 hearing and
his claim on appeal that he has actually been making good rehabilitative strides
while incarcerated. (8/3/11 Tr., p.5, L.15 - p.15, L.3.) While Costin's progress
while incarcerated is laudable and is undoubtedly relevant to the parole board's
consideration of whether to release Costin at his earliest parole date in
September 2012 (see 8/3/11 Tr., p.6, Ls.12-14), the district court correctly
determined that it was not itself a basis to reduce Costin's already reasonable
sentence. Costin has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
orders revoking Costin's probation and denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction
of sentence.
DATED this 15th day of June 2012.

LORI A. FLEMIN
Deputy Attorney Gene
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